The Ontology of the Secret Doctrine in Plato’s Theaetetus by Buckels, Christopher
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi �0.��63/�5685�84-��34�307
Phronesis 61 (2016) 243-259
brill.com/phro
The Ontology of the Secret Doctrine in Plato’s 
Theaetetus
Christopher Buckels
3601 Pacific Avenue, University of the Pacific, Stockton, CA 95211, USA
cbuckels@pacific.edu
Abstract
The paper offers an interpretation of a disputed portion of Plato’s Theaetetus that is 
often called the ‘Secret Doctrine’. It argues that the Secret Doctrine is a process ontol-
ogy which takes two types of process, swift and slow motions, as fundamental building 
blocks for ordinary material objects. Slow motions are powers which, when realized, 
generate swift motions, and these in turn are subjectively bundled to compose sensible 
objects and perceivers.
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1 Introduction
The ‘Secret Doctrine’ of Protagoras, Socrates tells us, was held in some form by 
nearly every wise man in the past, including Heraclitus and Homer (Theaetetus 
152c8-e9).1 While it may be that only a fictional Protagoras ever held it, the 
Secret Doctrine (SD) is a metaphysical thesis in Plato’s Theaetetus which is sup-
posed to support the historical Protagoras’ epistemological thesis that a thing 
is for a person as it appears to that person.2 SD provides the metaphysical 
1   Unless otherwise noted, all citations are to the latest OCT edition of the Theaetetus, in 
E. A. Duke et al. (eds.), Platonis Opera vol. 1 (Oxford, 1995). Translations are my own.
2   Cf. M. F. Burnyeat, The Theaetetus of Plato (Indianapolis, 1990), 10-19, who argues for the stron-
ger position that Plato believes SD to be implied by Protagoras’ Measure Doctrine, which in 
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underpinning to that thesis by maintaining that everything is continually com-
ing to be; nothing is one stable thing, itself by itself, but all things are constantly 
changing from one state to another in relation to one another (152d2-e1); this 
metaphysical position is often called a doctrine of radical flux. Such flux sup-
ports Protagoras’ epistemological position by ensuring that perception is infal-
lible and that it grasps truth, the two conditions that Theaetetus and Socrates 
agree knowledge must meet, because each occasion of perception is unique 
and private (cf. 152c5, 186c7-e7).
I examine SD and two prominent approaches to it, the Causal Theory 
Interpretation (CTI) and the Phenomenalist Interpretation (PI), both of 
which face grave difficulties. Although I develop an improved version of CTI, 
it proves to be incompatible with Protagoras’ Measure Doctrine. Plato, how-
ever, acknowledges this difficulty; a metaphysics compatible with the Measure 
Doctrine would have to be, in the final reckoning, exempt from it. In Section 2, 
I lay out the basics of SD. In Section 3, I examine CTI and PI and the difficul-
ties that beset these interpretations, and I develop replies to the difficulties 
on their behalf; each reply requires some significant concession. In Section 4, 
I develop an improved version of CTI. Finally, Section 5 considers a puzzle that 
arises from my version of CTI, but which also shows that Plato acknowledges 
CTI’s major concession.
2 The Secret Doctrine, Radical Flux and Perception
Our introduction to SD is in the deceptively simple claim that ‘nothing is one, 
either one thing or one kind of thing, but all things that we say are actually 
come to be in relation to one another from motion and change and blending’ 
(152d6-8). As Socrates spells this out, the implications become clearer: each 
thing comes to be in relation to something else; nothing is one thing, itself 
by itself, nor is it some determinate thing or kind of thing, but appears differ-
ently in relation to different observers, in comparison with different objects, at 
different times, and in different contexts. His first examples are colors, which 
(153e6-154a3):3
turn is implied by Theaetetus’ definition of knowledge as perception. For arguments against 
Burnyeat’s view, see T. Chappell, Reading Plato’s Theaetetus (Indianapolis, 2005), 49-63, 
and M.-K. Lee, Epistemology After Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle, and 
Democritus (Oxford, 2005), 88-92.
3   ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενημένον, καὶ ὃ δὴ 
ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν χρῶμα οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι 
ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός.
 245The Ontology of the Secret Doctrine in Plato’s Theaetetus
Phronesis 61 (2016) 243-259
. . . appear to have come to be from the approach of the eyes to the appro-
priate motion, and what we say each color is will be neither that which 
approaches nor that which is approached, but something private to each 
that has come to be between these.
Colors are, Socrates claims, private objects that arise from the relation between 
an observer and a visible thing, that is, as a byproduct of two motions (that 
of the eyes and that of the visible thing). In fact, Socrates goes on to say, each 
observer and each visible object is always changing (154a6-9). Thus any color 
that arises between me and an object at one time is distinct from the color that 
arises between us at another time, since I fail to be the same observer at the 
one time as I am at the other. We are left with fragmented, momentary entities 
that exist only in relation to other such entities, all of which are in constant 
motion, changing into different momentary entities.
Socrates, who reveals SD in several stages, goes on to say that the basic 
entities of this ontology are not merely in motion but are motions. Thus SD 
is a process ontology, where motions rather than objects are basic. A double 
dichotomy results in four kinds of motion, active and passive on the one 
hand, and slow and swift on the other. The slow motions move ‘in the same 
place’ and ‘in relation to what comes near’, but when an active slow motion and 
a passive slow motion interact, they generate swift motions, active and passive, 
which move about from place to place.4 His main example is seeing a stone; 
I quote 156d3-e7 in full, since it figures prominently in interpreting SD:5
Whenever an eye and something else that has come near it, something 
symmetric to it, beget whiteness and the sensation appropriate to it, 
those things that are begotten would never arise if each of the two of 
4   J. M. Cooper, Plato’s Theaetetus (New York, 1990), 39 suggests that slow motions are changes 
in quality and swift are changes in location. But this cannot be the whole story, since slow 
motions have their motion in relation to things that come close (τὰ πλησιάζοντα, 156c10). 
If two slow motions must draw near to each other to generate swift motions, at least one 
of these interacting slow motions must actually change place. Cf. J. M. Day, ‘The Theory of 
Perception in Plato’s Theaetetus 152-183’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 15 (1997), 51-80 
at 64, and Lee, Epistemology, n. 2 above, 106.
5   ἐπειδὰν οὖν ὄμμα καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτῳ συμμέτρων πλησιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν λευκότητά τε καὶ 
αἴσθησιν αὐτῇ σύμφυτον, ἃ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐγένετο ἑκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ 
μεταξὺ φερομένων τῆς μὲν ὄψεως πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ συναποτίκτοντος 
τὸ χρῶμα, ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὄψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ ὁρᾷ δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο οὔ τι ὄψις ἀλλ’ 
ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρῶν, τὸ δὲ συγγεννῆσαν τὸ χρῶμα λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὖ 
ἀλλὰ λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὁτῳοῦν συνέβη χρῆμα χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι.
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them had gone to another thing, and at that time, while sight from the 
eyes and whiteness from that from which color was generated are moving 
about between them, the eye becomes filled with sight and sees, and at 
that time becomes not at all sight, but a seeing eye, and that which begot 
the color is filled with whiteness and becomes, in turn, not whiteness, but 
white, either wood or stone or whatever happens to have such a color.
The eye and stone, which play the roles of slow motions, generate twins 
when they are close enough: sensible whiteness and the sensation of seeing 
white. These twins—swift motions—move about between the parents; while 
they move, the eye becomes a seeing eye and the stone becomes a white stone. 
Proximity causes those slow motions to generate those swift motions, and the 
seeing eye and a white stone exist only in relation to each other. If the interac-
tion were instead between a stone and hand, the stone would generate rough-
ness, or heaviness, etc. But even in the case of a different eye—two people 
looking at one rock—the stone generates distinct swift motions for each eye. 
This whiteness and this act of seeing whiteness have never existed before, nor 
will they ever exist again; they are private to the stone and the eye. In fact, an 
observer cannot see that same whiteness on two separate occasions, for there 
can be no same observer at different times. Each observer that seems to be a 
unified object across times is really an infinite succession of observers, each 
distinct from the last (166b7-c2). The eye that sees whiteness at one time differs 
from the eye that sees whiteness at another. Thus SD denies these apparent 
cases of identity over time. It is also clear that we are left with a world that is 
radically dependent on perceivers, where it seems that to be is to be perceived, 
since nothing is absolutely, but only in relation to some perceiver.
When Socrates returns to refute SD, he reveals alteration and locomotion as 
kinds of motion and that all things move in both ways (181c1-e8). This informa-
tion is not completely surprising; when slow motions were introduced, they 
could not be stationary, despite being described as moving in the same place, 
since they must approach each other to interact. They must also, it seems, be 
changing qualitatively; perhaps they are continually altering into powers of dif-
ferent sorts. Likewise, swift motions continually change place, but they must 
also continually change quality. A swift motion of whiteness must change almost 
immediately into a different color.6 This consequence is revealed at 182d1-e6: 
the sensation and sensible are already changing at the very moment they are 
generated. While someone calls the stone ‘white’, its color is already chang-
ing; indeed, the very whiteness of the white is changing into something else. 
6   Cf. Lee, Epistemology, n. 2 above, 105.
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Socrates then contends that Theaetetus’ thesis, that knowledge is perception, 
is no more true than false, since knowledge changes into non-perception at the 
very moment Theaetetus utters his thesis. Although Socrates, Theaetetus and 
Theodorus abandon the theory, we may still ask if the theory is consistent 
and whether Plato endorses any part of it. In the next section, we examine two 
interpretations that try to make sense of SD, as well as the problems they face.
3 Interpretations of the Secret Doctrine
There are two prominent approaches to resolving SD’s difficulties, which Jane 
Day, following Crombie, labels the ‘Causal Theory’ interpretation (CTI) and 
the ‘Phenomenalist’ interpretation (PI).7 According to CTI, SD gives a physical 
explanation of how perceivers and objects, which are slow motions, generate 
sensations and sensible properties, which are, in turn, swift motions. In Day’s 
words (with her emphasis): ‘Physical objects in interacting cause perceived 
qualities to arise, which in turn constitute perceptual objects.’ This interpreta-
tion assumes the existence of physical objects, which is why proponents of 
PI reject it; they take sensations and sensibles—swift motions—as the basic 
entities of this flux ontology. According to PI, swift motions explain and even 
compose perceivers and ordinary objects. Day explains: ‘The “slow” fluxes are 
identified with the “aggregates”, and thus are taken as being logically depen-
dent on the “quicker” fluxes, as opposed to causing them.’ In other words, slow 
motions are constituted by swift motions. Although PI seems to give a bet-
ter theory of perception, since it uses only phenomenally-accessible entities, 
namely swift motions, it is problematic because it reverses the causal depen-
dency indicated in the text, making slow motions dependent on swift motions 
rather than vice versa.
Day admits that both interpretations are problematic but argues that CTI is 
more so. As she explains CTI, slow motions are physical objects which beget 
swift motions, and these swift motions produce sensible objects.8 Thus there 
are two types of entity, physical and sensible. Physical objects, it seems, are not 
sensible, nor are sensible objects physical; the problem is that the text does 
7   Day, ‘Perception’, n. 4 above, 65; cf. Burnyeat, Theaetetus, n. 2 above, 16 (calling the two inter-
pretations the ‘physical’ and ‘metaphysical’ theories, respectively); Lee, Epistemology, n. 2 
above, 96 n. 38.
8   Day appears to be following J. W. Yolton, ‘The Ontological Status of Sense-Data in Plato’s 
Theory of Perception’, Review of Metaphysics 3 (1949), 21-58, in describing the Causal Theory 
interpretation.
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not make this distinction. One may also press CTI about these entities: how 
can an object be physical but non-sensible? Day attacks details of CTI’s pro-
posed causal story: ‘How can it be said that when sight travels from the eye 
the eye comes to be “full of sight”, or that when the whiteness travels from the 
object the object is “filled up with whiteness”? (156d6-e5).’9 To explain this 
causally seems hopeless, as the eye should be empty of sight if sight travels 
from it, not full of sight. Finally, Day compares perception in the Theaetetus 
with the Timaeus, which makes clear, she argues, that ‘Plato makes no move to 
explain perception causally’ in the Theaetetus, since he does try to do this in 
the markedly different Timaeus. Thus the causal story portrayed in the text is, 
according to Day, mostly figurative: Plato is not trying to give us a causal theory 
of perception.
Although PI looks fairly attractive according to this reasoning, it takes the 
text to be so figurative as to be unreliable as the basis of a theory.10 The text 
explicitly states that swift motions are generated from slow motions, so an 
interpretation should be able to explain this rather than explaining it away. 
The theory might be in tension with itself, as Day ultimately claims, but it 
should not obviously be so, as it would be if swift motions are generated by 
slow motions and also compose them.11 On the one hand, it is implausible that 
Plato intends slow motions to be dependent upon swift motions and yet, on 
the other, it is also implausible to distinguish physical and sensible objects.
It would be helpful to clarify what is at stake between the two interpretations. 
Prima facie, very little: Socrates ultimately refutes SD, and either interpretation 
can be used to show that a metaphysics that can support Protagoras’ Measure 
Doctrine—that man is the measure of what is—must ultimately fail in some 
way. But the interesting question is precisely how the theory fails. According to 
PI, sensations and sensible properties come from nowhere, which gives us a 
dubitable metaphysics from the start. A reader should question whether Plato 
has given us any support for the Measure Doctrine: surely he could do better! 
But, according to CTI, support comes via physical objects that are exceptions 
to the Measure Doctrine, which hardly seems better. In the next section, I hope 
to give a more satisfying alternative to these.
9    Day, ‘Perception’, n. 4 above, 66. Day indicates that she is taking this question from 
Crombie.
10   Day (‘Perception’, n. 4 above, 68) shares this worry, but she writes that we can ‘neverthe-
less describe the theory as predominantly, even if not consistently’ phenomenalist.
11   Day, ‘Perception’, n. 4 above, 70: ‘Such a theory [as we get on her interpretation] is of 
course logically incoherent, as there is no fixed term by reference to which the others can 
be explained or defined.’
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First, though, let us investigate the two interpretations in more detail, 
beginning with Day’s arguments against CTI. One is directed against the 
causal credentials of the theory: how can an eye be full of sight when sight 
moves from the eye? In the relevant passage, 156d3-e7, Socrates says: ‘while 
sight from the eyes and whiteness from that which generated the color are 
moving about between them, at that time the eye becomes filled with sight 
and sees, and then it becomes not at all sight, but a seeing eye.’ The text tells 
us that swift motions move between two slow motions that have come close 
to each another. But commentators often add an extra detail, borrowed from 
the Timaeus: swift motions, they say, move from one slow motion to another.12 
Some commentators even write that two swift motions meet and commingle.13 
This meeting is not, however, in the text. Of course these details seem natural 
supplementations, as one might imagine one swift motion as a ray of light that 
leaps from eye to stone and the other as a ray of light that emanates or bounces 
from stone to eye. Perhaps these rays meet in the middle and rebound to their 
parents, or perhaps they continue on their way to stone and eye, respectively. 
The rays might even fuse into a ‘pencil of energy’ or ‘pencil of light’.14
But the Theaetetus does not supply such details.15 Instead, swift motions 
are said to move from slow motions and to move about between them. If prox-
imity suffices to cause slow motions to beget swift, why must swift motions 
make contact with each other or either slow motion? We should leave it as the 
text does: swift motions move between slow motions, and the eye is filled with 
sight and the stone with whiteness at the same time as the swift motions are 
12   E.g. J. McDowell, Plato: Theaetetus (Oxford, 1973), 139-40. Cf. Day, ‘Perception’, n. 4 
above, 66.
13   E.g. Yolton, ‘The Ontological Status’, n. 8 above; George Nakhnikian, ‘Plato’s Theory of 
Sensation’, Review of Metaphysics 9 (1955), 129-48 and 306-27 at 139.
14   Nakhnikian, ‘Plato’s Theory’, n. 13 above, 142-3, 149-50: ‘According to Theaetetus 156E, 
προσβάλλον and προσβαλλόμενον meet and form a continuous “pencil” of light.’ The only 
claim in 156e that appears to give any support to this statement is the claim that sight 
and whiteness are ‘moving between’ the eye and stone (μεταξὺ φερομένων, 156d6-e1). 
Nakhnikian appears to be incorporating the Timaeus’ account of vision and relying, in 
part, on Taylor’s interpretation thereof. Cf. F. M. Cornford, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge: 
The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato (New York, 1957), 50.
15   One could, of course, show how the Timaeus and Theaetetus do not contradict, and one 
could even try to show how the Timaeus develops the Theaetetus’ account of perception, 
but this is not necessary for understanding the Theaetetus itself, and it might actually 
hinder understanding.
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moving about in the middle.16 It is not said that swift motions need complete 
any particular course of movement at all: they simply move in the ‘in-between’. 
The text is fully compatible with sight returning to the eye (to fill it with sight) 
or with the eye being filled with sight merely by proximity to sight moving 
about nearby. Since proximity suffices for generating swift motions, it should 
also suffice for producing a seeing eye. There is, then, no problem with a causal 
explanation of the eye becoming filled with sight.
Day could grant this claim but press another criticism: if Plato merely leaves 
open ways to build a causal account of perception from the text, then he is not 
detailing such an account. If he were, he would certainly include such relevant 
causal details as how the eye becomes filled with sight. He does include such 
detail, after all, in the Timaeus. But this hardly seems an objection: the Timaeus 
is the right place for Plato to give all the physical details relevant to an account 
of perception. The Theaetetus, by contrast, is not, just as it is not the right place 
to solve, for example, the problem of not being. One must go to the Sophist to 
find this task taken up, just as one must go to the Timaeus to find a complete 
physical account of perception. In the Theaetetus Plato simply lays the founda-
tions of a plausible theory of perception—whether he endorses it or not—in 
order to examine the contention that knowledge is perception, along with the 
accompanying and supporting contention that nothing is one thing, itself by 
itself, but everything becomes what it becomes in relation to something else.17 
 
16   The claim that swift motions make contact with the sense organ and object of sensation 
may be due, in part, to how related passages are translated. At 153e6-154a3 (quoted above 
in the main text), colors are said to come to be from the approach (προσβολή) of the eyes to 
the appropriate (προσήκουσαν) motion. Many translators render προσβολή as ‘impact’: e.g. 
Burnyeat, Theaetetus, n. 2 above, ad loc., and H. N. Fowler, Plato: Theaetetus (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1921), ad loc. Cf. Day, ‘Perception’, n. 4 above, who uses ‘encounter’ (53), and 
Cornford, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge, n. 14 above, 40, who uses ‘meeting’. While ‘impact’ 
is a common meaning of προσβολή, it is an over-translation here, since an impact requires 
contact and προσβολή does not. If there were contact, it is difficult to see how color could 
arise ‘between’ the two motions. Instead, the notion προσβολή conveys is that of some-
thing ‘thrown toward’ another thing, often in an attack. Accordingly, we should not trans-
late τὸ προσβάλλον and τὸ προσβαλλόμενον as requiring contact, e.g. that which collides and 
that with which it collides, but as that which approaches and that which is approached; 
Cf. McDowell, Theaetetus, n. 12 above, followed by Lee, Epistemology, n. 2 above, 95.
17   Plato need not endorse the theory himself, even if Theaetetus agrees with Socrates that it 
is a plausible theory. It need only be plausible to the characters and, perhaps, the intended 
audience.
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The foundations of a causal theory are sufficient for that purpose—it mat-
ters not how the eye is filled with whiteness, just that this happens while and 
because sight is moving about between the eye and object. Thus we can lay 
aside these two criticisms of CTI.
Let us take a closer look at PI. David Sedley, a representative thereof, writes 
that slow motions, or ‘parents’, are ‘simply bundles of perceptual twins’.18 
This thesis streamlines SD; parents are bundles of offspring, which generate 
new offspring (and new parents). SD thus eliminates all entities except sen-
sible properties and sensations, since the former completely constitute 
sensible objects and the latter completely constitute perceivers. Even space 
may be relativized, as Sedley points out, because sensibles and perceivers may 
be located relative to one another rather than absolutely.
Let us look more closely at swift motions. We are given such examples as hot 
and hard and white (156e6-8). These are sensible properties. In fact, they are 
instances of such properties, since each sensation is private and distinct from 
every other: this whiteness is distinct from that whiteness. Nonetheless these 
two can be qualitatively indistinguishable, i.e. resemble each other exactly, 
and so are both instances of whiteness, although SD would deny that there is 
a Whiteness over and above the instances. In other words, SD is a sort of trope 
nominalism. Tropes, or property-instances, are such things as this heat and 
this whiteness, and Heat, the universal, is simply the group of all heat tropes. 
The range of tropes in the Theaetetus extends beyond sensible properties. In 
addition to this whiteness, we have this act of seeing whiteness; in addition to 
this heat, we have this act of feeling heat. Both members of each pair must be 
of the same ontological kind, since the sensible property and the sensation are 
both swift motions. They are also both particular, since a different observer 
would see a different white from what I see, even if we both observe the same 
shade of white. If swift motions are tropes, then PI can identify all objects, 
perceivers and perceived alike, as bundles of tropes. This makes SD a single- 
category ontology.
So far, however, PI has not given us a response to one major objection: the 
text explicitly states that slow motions generate swift motions. How can this 
happen, if slow motions are bundles of swift motions? A regress threatens: each 
slow motion is constituted by previously existing swift motions, which were 
themselves produced by slow motions. There must be some slow motions that 
first began producing swift motions without themselves being constituted of 
18   D. N. Sedley, The Midwife of Platonism (Oxford, 2005), 46.
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swift motions.19 Although this argument renders PI problematic, it may push 
the text too hard: it seems that Plato is not laying out every detail of a theory 
of perception but is merely giving readers enough information to understand 
(and refute) SD and Protagoras’ Measure Doctrine.
PI does, however, run into a more serious difficulty. Consider the case of the 
stone and eye: each must be, according to PI, a bundle of swift motions which 
in turn generates swift motions. Swift motions are sensibles and sensations: 
in this case, they are whiteness and sight. But Socrates clearly reveals that 
the stone and eye are not sensed or sensing until swift motions pass between 
them. The eye is not a seeing eye, nor is the stone a white stone, until two slow 
motions draw close enough to generate swift motions. If the stone is not white 
until the eye approaches, it cannot be an aggregate of sensible properties such 
as whiteness; an imperceptible stone cannot be a bundle of sensible prop-
erties! Likewise, the eye cannot be a bundle of sensations before it produces 
sight. We need pre-existing slow motions to generate sensation and sensibles, 
which PI firmly denies. So let us return to CTI, which gives us such entities, to 
see if it can be salvaged.
4 A Second Look at CTI
Sensibles, such as whiteness and hardness, and sensations, such as seeing and 
feeling, are swift motions, which are generated from slow motions coming 
close to one another. But, setting aside slow motions for the moment, what 
are people and stones? Socrates suggests an answer: human beings and stones 
are aggregates (ἁθροίσματα, 157b8-c1). He does not say of what they are aggre-
gates, but, since a stone becomes a white stone by being filled with whiteness 
(156e4-7), and the same with hardness and heat and all the rest of such qual-
ities (156e7-9), it seems that stones and the like are aggregates of sensibles. 
A stone is an aggregate of whiteness, hardness and other sensible properties. 
In addition, since nothing is one thing itself by itself, but all things come about 
from motion through their mutual interaction (156e9-157a2), the stone only 
exists in relation to an observer, who, in turn, exists only in relation to the stone 
and whatever else is observed at that moment. Thus, the observer is also an 
aggregate, namely an aggregate of sensations, such as a seeing eye, hearing 
ear etc., and in addition of sensibles, since perceivers are perceived by other 
19   M. Matthen, ‘Perception, Relativism, Truth: Reflections on Plato’s Theaetetus 152-160’, 
Dialogue 24 (1985), 33-58, points out that a regress develops: there must be a first parent 
(a first generator) somewhere along the line.
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perceivers. These two aggregates (sensing and sensible) are even separable, 
so that Socrates qua perceiver is not the same as Socrates qua perceived by 
Theaetetus.20 In fact, this latter Socrates would differ, in turn, from Socrates 
qua perceived by Theodorus. Where there seems to be one person, there are 
in fact three. As perceivers increase, so do Socrateses, until there are countless 
men where there seemed to be but one (cf. 166b7-c2).
It is, however, difficult to reconcile this picture with CTI’s slow and swift 
motions. If the stone is a mere aggregate of sensible properties, which are 
swift motions, then what are slow motions? As Day explains CTI, slow motions 
are physical objects which beget swift motions, and these swift motions pro-
duce sensible objects.21 The distinction between physical and sensible objects 
is problematic, as Day argues, because it is not in the text. But is CTI com-
mitted to it? Since the distinction cannot be found in the text, let us use one 
20   Yolton, ‘The Ontological Status’, n. 8 above, does not seem to account for this when he 
infers that there is a problem applying the theory of perception to other perceptions than 
sight. Yolton takes touch as a particular problem, since, he says, when one sees colors in 
an object, one does not become so colored, but when one feels hotness or coldness, one 
does become hot or cold (28-9). There are several things to point out in regard to this 
claim, but the first is that we do not see color in an object. In the process of perception, 
the eye becomes a seeing eye, and the stone, for example, becomes a white stone; but 
sight and whiteness move about between the eye and the stone. Applying this to touch, we 
would imagine that the skin becomes touching skin, and the stone becomes a hot stone, 
when touch and hotness move about between the skin and stone. It must be granted, of 
course, that there is not much room between these two, but this is not a serious obstacle 
to the theory. In touching a hot stone, the skin may indeed become hot itself, due to what 
Locke calls a tertiary quality, but a distinction must be made between skin that is feeling 
hotness, that is, the sensing skin, and skin that feels hot, that is, skin that is hot to the 
touch. According to SD, these skins are different objects, for one is a sense organ that has 
a certain unique perception, namely heat, and the other is a perceptual object that is per-
ceived by another sense organ. So if I touch a stone that has been sitting out in the sun, 
I will feel a sensation of warmth in my fingers. If someone else comes over and touches 
my fingers at this moment, then they will feel hot to the touch, so that the other person 
may say to me: ‘Your fingers feel hot.’ What Yolton calls ‘becoming hot’ is really, then, two 
things, feeling heat and being felt as hot by another (or even, one might say, by one’s other 
hand). There is no parallel to this problem in sight, since my eyes do not look white to 
someone else just because I see something white, but this does not make touch a problem 
case. Yolton assumes that skin is one thing, itself by itself, something that can both sense 
and be sensed, which is simply not possible in SD.
21   Day, ‘Perception’, n. 4 above, 65-6, appears to be following Yolton, ‘The Ontological Status’, 
n. 8 above, in describing CTI: an adherent ‘must assume (with Yolton) that the theory [of 
perception] makes a distinction between these physical objects just mentioned [i.e. the 
slow motions] and “perceptual objects” such as men or sticks’.
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that is in the text, namely the distinction between slow and swift motions. 
Swift motions do not produce sensible objects, they are sensibles. Recall that 
SD is a process ontology: the world is made up of motions, not of objects. 
The text does not speak of motions producing sensible objects; there is only the 
production of swift motions—sensibles and sensations—from slow motions. 
In turn, then, there are no physical objects in this ontology simply because 
there are no objects: slow motions are not physical objects.
Before dividing motions into swift and slow, Socrates divided them in 
another way: there are active powers and there are passive powers. I suggest, 
on CTI’s behalf, that we employ this division when considering slow motions. 
Some are active powers and some passive powers. The eye in Socrates’ example 
is a power of seeing, and the stone that generates whiteness is a power of being 
seen. When these powers are realized, upon coming into proximity with each 
other, they produce swift motions: the power of seeing produces sight, and 
the power of being seen produces something seen, that is, whiteness. Sight 
and whiteness in turn produce a seeing eye and a white stone. Sight produces 
a seeing eye because sight is the realization of the power of seeing. Likewise, 
whiteness is the realization of the power of being seen, producing a seen thing, 
for example, a white stone.
This diagram illustrates the process of generating swift motions from slow 
motions and of producing a seeing eye and a white something. First, two 
symmetric powers, in this case, the power of seeing and the power of being 
seen, come into proximity. Secondly, the powers interact by generating swift 
motions, and this interaction realizes the two powers. The realized power of 
seeing is the seeing eye, which is produced when sight moves between the two 
powers, and the realized power of being seen is the white something, which is 
produced when whiteness moves between the two powers.
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It may be, however, that the powers here are too coarse: a white stone is a 
realized power of being seen-as-white, not simply a power of being seen. In fact 
Socrates’ example of wine that tastes bitter to one tongue and sweet to another 
demands finer-grained powers (159c15-e5). The healthy and sick tongues have 
different powers and interact differently with wine: the healthy tongue has a 
power of tasting-sweetness that is realized when brought in contact with wine’s 
power of being tasted-as-sweet, but the sick tongue has a power of tasting-
bitterness that is realized when brought in contact with wine’s power of being 
tasted-as-bitter. The eye and tongue, then, involve different powers, the powers 
of tasting-sweetness and tasting-bitterness (among others) in the tongue, and 
the powers of seeing-white and seeing-red (among others) in the eye.
It seems, then, that ordinary objects are aggregates of powers rather than 
sensibles, but this is not quite right. In a way, sensible objects are bundles 
of sensibles, but there is no objective bundling that produces these objects. 
If there were, objects would exist of which no man is the measure. Instead, 
perceivers cobble together disparate sensibles and call them objects, just 
as various sensations are bundled together to form perceivers. There are no 
unified sensible objects, just sensibles, and no unified perceivers, just sensa-
tions. There are only Socrates’ aggregates (ἁθροίσματα, 157b8-c1): the whiteness 
and hardness and roughness etc. that are moving about between my sensory 
powers and the powers that generated them are the stone; and the seeing 
and feeling etc. moving about in between are me. If I were to cease sensing 
entirely, I would cease existing too. The stone, in turn, ceases to exist when I 
turn my back on it. This new version of CTI gives us exactly what Protagoras’ 
Measure Doctrine requires: private objects, things that exist for one and only 
one perceiver. Along with this, it gives us perceivers who only exist in relation 
to what they are perceiving. And, in accord with SD, these objects exist for only 
a moment, the moment in which they are perceived, and they are replaced 
with new objects and perceivers a moment later—even if these new objects 
and perceivers are seemingly identical to the old ones.22 But that is not the 
22   One may see in SD a temporal parts ontology, where ordinary material objects are com-
posed of instantaneous time slices of three-dimensional objects. As with the bundling 
of sensibles, the aggregating of time slices into one history—which would then be one 
object, a stone or a tree or a person—would be subjective. No objective relations tie the 
time slice at t1 of the object we call Socrates to the time slice at t2 (which we also call 
Socrates, although it is not identical to the Socrates at t1). We thus have an immaculate 
replacement of all properties at every instant, to take up a term from contemporary meta-
physics: cf. D. Ehring, ‘Temporal Parts and Bundle Theory’, Philosophical Studies 104 (2001), 
163-8.
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whole story, for there is something still there when no one is looking: the power 
to be seen, or felt, or heard etc. Slow motions underlie sensible aggregates and 
sensory aggregates, producing them anew at every moment.
The original formulation of CTI was correct, then, but phrased mislead-
ingly. There are swift motions which we subjectively aggregate and call sen-
sible objects, but there are, objectively, no such objects. Those sensibles are 
produced by slow motions, which should not be called physical objects, since 
they are not physical and they are not objects. We should preserve Socrates’ 
name for them—slow motions—or perhaps dub them powers; but ‘physical 
objects’ will not do.
This reformulation of CTI is not, however, without difficulty. In fact, it is a 
difficulty the adherents of PI foresaw: such an ontology is incompatible with 
Protagoras’ Measure Doctrine, for there is no perceptual access to its basic 
entities, slow motions. If things are for me as they appear to me, as Protagoras 
maintains, how can slow motions be for me at all, since they never appear to 
me? I see colors, but I do not see the powers that generate color; these powers 
exist—independently of any viewer—as long as viewer and viewed are close 
enough to generate swift motions.23 Man is not, then, the measure of these 
independently existing powers. Since commitment to entities that exist prior 
to being perceived is contrary to the letter and spirit of Protagoras’ position, 
CTI still seems flawed.
The defender of CTI might respond that these ‘independently existing’ pow-
ers only exist, and are only independent, in a manner of speaking. Socrates has 
banished ‘being’ from the conversation, since all things come to be in relation 
to other things. Slow motions have, if anything, a potential existence, in that 
they can come to be and be realized if they are close enough to a slow motion 
that is symmetrical. They are only loosely ‘independent’, since they depend 
on other slow motions for their coming into being and realization. There is 
no slow motion present unless it is interacting with another, that is, unless 
a perceiver is interacting with something perceivable; and then there is only 
one thing that can be generated, namely, whatever the perceiver judges to be. 
Man is truly the measure of what is, since sensations and sensibles ‘are’ as he 
23   An anonymous referee suggests that slow motions can seem to me to exist, and thus 
things are for me (there is a slow motion for me) as they appear to me. So, if I judge some-
thing to be white, I also judge that there is something in the world that caused me to see 
whiteness, that is, it seems to me that something in the world has the power to make me 
see whiteness. Nonetheless, these powers exist even if I do not judge them to exist, which 
still causes a problem for the Measure Doctrine.
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perceives them to be, and the powers that generate them ‘are’ such that they 
generate exactly what he judges to be.
This reply is, unfortunately, unsatisfying. It seems that the defender of CTI 
is retreating to PI: do not take slow motions as really there, existing before 
any swift motions come to be, but as potentially existing, or having a quasi-
existence, or, as PI holds, being somewhat metaphorical. How would such 
entities complete their allotted task, namely to generate actually existing swift 
motions? With this defense, CTI would give an unsatisfying reading of the text, 
just as PI does.
Whichever way we go, then, the defender of the Secret Doctrine has to make 
a major concession. Either take the text seriously and posit entities to which 
Protagoras’s Measure Doctrine does not apply, or do not take it literally, and 
regard the theory as failing to supply a basis for a theory of perception. In fact, 
though, there is evidence that Plato is aware of this dilemma and that CTI is 
his intended reading. To see this, we must consider a further implication of 
independently existing slow motions. The resulting theory has affinities with 
Plato’s other treatments of perception, but it also seems that the details of such 
a theory need not be fully worked out in order to understand the argument 
against SD in the Theaetetus. In fact, only swift motions are needed for the 
argument to work.24
5 The Secret Doctrine: An Exceptional Ontology
Let us briefly review our reading of SD. Strictly speaking, sensible particulars 
are bundles of sensibles, for example whiteness, hardness, loudness etc. These 
sensibles can be understood as the tropes of contemporary metaphysics; they 
are particular instances of sensory properties, not universals. Thus this white-
ness is numerically distinct from that whiteness. The bundling of tropes is not 
objective but subjective: man is the measure of what is, since each person 
bundles sensory properties into private objects. There are no objective objects: 
sensible particulars are subjective bundles of sensibles that exist only in rela-
tion to a (similarly bundled) perceiver.
24   Thus I agree with Day, ‘Perception’, n. 4 above, that Plato does not present his own theory 
of perception in the Theaetetus, even though it has affinities with theories he presents 
elsewhere.
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So far this is review. But in addition to sensible particulars, there are 
extended particulars: beyond subjectively bundled sensory properties are the 
powers that underlie and generate those properties. Extended particulars 
include sensibles and the powers that generate sensibles. The white stone 
(a sensible particular) is a bundle of a white trope, a hard trope and so on, 
but the extended particular associated with the white stone also includes as 
constituents the power of generating whiteness, the power of generating hard-
ness, and all other associated powers. Extended particulars are not sensible, 
since the powers that partially compose them are not sensible: powers are 
not directly, but only indirectly, sensible. Like the wind, powers are sensible 
through their effects. But extended particulars are subjective, inheriting their 
subjectivity from associated sensible particulars. Thus an extended particular 
is a subjective bundling of certain sensibles along with the powers that gener-
ate those sensibles.25
We may now consider a puzzle about extended particulars. Recall that the 
stone must be symmetrical to the eye in order for the pair to produce swift 
motions (ὄμμα καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτῳ συμμέτρων, 156d4-5).26 Thus the underly-
ing powers—the ones that, for example, generate whiteness and seeing white-
ness—must be symmetrical, or able to interact. A power to generate sight 
cannot interact with a power to generate hardness: it can only interact with 
25   An initial puzzle that arises for extended particulars concerns their boundaries. Why 
include the power that generates whiteness as a constituent of the extended particular 
associated with the white stone but not include the power that generates sight (or, that 
generates seeing whiteness), since whiteness is generated by the interaction of both the 
sight power and the whiteness power? Sensible particulars are fairly easily delineated—
my seeing the rock is not part of it—but extended particulars are another matter entirely. 
This may not be a defect, however, for SD endorses only a relative existence bound up in 
the interaction of two motions, an active and a passive. We may even grant that extended 
particulars include both the powers to generate sensibles and the powers to generate 
sensations, so that the extended particular is ‘extended between’ sensible particular and 
perceiver. The extended particular associated with a given perceiver would then include 
(1) all current sensations, (2) all powers giving rise to those sensations and (3) all powers 
generating the sensibles sensed in those sensations. Remember that the perceiver qua 
perceiver differs from the perceiver qua perceived, since a perceiver is perceived by 
others—it is a bundle of sensibles—and perceives others—it is a bundle of sensations. 
The analysis of the extended particular associated with the bundle of sensations, that is, 
the perceiver, can be applied mutatis mutandis to the extended particular associated with 
the bundle of sensibles, for example, the white stone.
26   This point is taken up at Timaeus 67c7, where portions of fire must be symmetrical 
to sight (ὄψει σύμμετρα μόρια ἔχουσαν πρὸς αἴσθησιν) in order to be seen by the eyes. 
Cf. Chappell, Theaetetus, n. 2 above, 77.
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a power to generate color. So the underlying powers associated with eye and 
stone must have some properties before they interact, even though everything 
is supposed to be the product of motion. The stone must be able-to-be-seen, 
and the eye must be able-to-see-stones. Without these powers, neither could 
interact, and there would be no seeing eye or white stone. Likewise, at 153e7, 
the eye approaches a ‘fitting’ motion (προσήκουσαν φοράν), indicating that this 
motion and eye must be commensurate for sight and color to occur. The eye 
and motion must be capable of mutual interaction independent of any sen-
sible properties, since perception itself depends on those powers.
In sum, then, Plato has exposed a fault in purely relational ontologies: in 
order for two things to interact, they must be capable of interaction. Their 
underlying powers must be the right kind of powers. Since Protagoras’ Measure 
Doctrine requires interaction between perceivers and sensible particulars, and 
since sensible particulars appear to and are judged by perceivers to be as they 
appear, SD also requires interaction between perceivers and sensible particu-
lars. SD’s relational, subjective ontology requires a non-relational, objective 
underpinning, one which, furthermore, is relatively stable rather than an ever-
changing process, since the eye and stone must be symmetrical for at least 
as long as it takes to approach each other, to generate swift motions, and to 
allow those swift motions to move about between them. Those underlying 
slow motions, finally, must have some properties to exist; SD’s metaphysics 
does not, in other words, allow for bare particulars, since slow motions must 
have commensurate powers. Even though CTI is in tension with the Measure 
Doctrine, it is not a tension Plato has overlooked: it is a tension he presents as 
necessary! CTI does not work, then, because the Measure Doctrine does not 
work, as Socrates takes pains to show when he refutes Protagoras. A metaphys-
ics that can support the Measure Doctrine must be an exception to it.27
27   Thanks to Jan Szaif, Peter Larsen and Thomas Chance for valuable discussion of previ-
ous versions of this paper, as well as to audiences at the Ancient Philosophy Workshop 
in Austin, Texas, and at the Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical 
Association. I also thank an anonymous referee at Phronesis for helpful comments.
